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Introduction
The growth of regional trade blocs has been one of the major developments in international relations in recent years. During the 1990s, regionalism was conceived as a developmental option in itself that would promote competitiveness of trade bloc members and help their fast integration into the international economy. As Regional agreements vary widely, but all have the objective of reducing barriers to trade between member countries-which implies discrimination against trade with other countries. At their simplest, these agreements merely remove tariffs on intra bloc trade in goods, but many go beyond that to cover non-tariff barriers and to extend liberalization to investment and other policies. At their deepest, they have the goal of economic union and involve the construction of shared executive, judicial, and legislative institutions. Many factors, some explicitly stated and others not so publicly admitted, have been responsible for the recent spurt in regionalism. The desire to put the multilateral system into faster and deeper action in selected areas by creating more powerful blocs that would operate within the GATT/WTO system 2 and the fear of being left out while the rest of the world swept into regionalism, the domino effect are often cited as the major reason for the growth of RTAs. After China's entry into WTO , the 2 Article XXIV of the GATT, 1994 imposes three basic obligations on WTO members wishing to enter into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) covering trade in goods---i) An obligation to notify the FTA to the WTO; ii) An obligation not to raise the overall level of protection and make access of products of third parties not participating in the FTA more onerous (the so-called external trade requirement); and iii) An obligation to liberalize substantially all the trade among constituents of the FTA (the so-called internal trade requirement).
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East Asia has experienced a massive domino effect with dozens of new RTAs being announced, negotiated and signed (Baldwin 2006 Political considerations also features in decisions to establish RTAs, especially when governments seek to consolidate peace and increase regional security as well as to acquire greater bargaining power in multilateral negotiations by first tying in partner countries through regional commitments.
There has been considerable debate in academic circles about the impact of RTAs on the member countries and on the rest of the world (Bhagwati and Krueger; Krueger 1997). One view for RTAs has been that they improve resource allocation within a region and improve income for member countries by reducing the trade barriers.
Consumers are better off as they can buy the goods form the most efficient supplier at the lowest cost. This is so called trade creation effect for the members. On other hand, the arguments are given that by its nature, an RTA is discriminatory for the nonmembers and members gain at the expanse of the non-members, resulting into trade diversion. In general an RTA would lead to some amount of both trade creation and trade diversion effects (Krueger 1997) . If the trade diversion is sufficiently large relative to the trade creation effects, the RTA could conceivably end up being harmful to the member countries.
In this research paper, we empirically analyze the -India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement‖ (ISLFTA) to find out the trade creation or diversion effects of ISLFTA on rest of the world. We use the detailed trade data (HS 6 digit level) to study the trade effects under ISLFTA. The reason for choosing this FTA is that it is one of the few South-South Agreements that is working credibly and could be an example for other South-South Agreements to emulate. Holmes (2005) for example, also found that India Sri Lanka FTA is an effective Regional Trade Agreements and one of few effective South-South Agreements. Using gravity model she tested 122 FTAs and found that only This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief outline of ISLFTA , using trade flows makes an assessment about the effectiveness of this Agreement, Section 3 presents Literature Review, Section 4 discusses the Methodology used for analysis of ISLFTA, Section 5 gives a brief outline of the theoretical model, Section 6 describes the data sources and limitations of data, Section 7 covers econometric issues and discusses the results, and finally, Section 8 concludes the paper summarizing the major finding of this study. 3 The Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, commonly referred to as the ‗Harmonised System' or HS, is an international commodity classification system developed under the auspices of the Brussels-based Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), known today as the World Customs Organization (WCO). The Harmonised System consists of 21 sections covering 99 Chapters, 1,241 headings and over 5,000 commodity groups. 4 Items, which are considered sensitive to the domestic industry by each partner to FTA, are included in the respective negative list. The items in negative list of Sri Lanka are not entitled for any duty concessions for imports from India. The same rule applies in case of India's negative list for Sri Lankan products. 5 The positive list and residual list are considered less sensitive to domestic interests by each partner and are included in the phased reduction of tariffs by both sides. All the three lists in respect of India and Sri Lanka are available on Sri Lanka's Department of Commerce website. http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/indusrilanka_freetrade.php. 6 The customs duties applied to imported goods may differ depending on the country from which the goods were exported. Most industrial products, available on the market today, are produced in more than one country. For example, in the case of cotton shirts, it is possible that the cotton used in their production is manufactured in country A, the textile woven, dyed and printed in country B, the cloth cut 6 criteria for a product to qualify for tariff concessions from the importing member. A comparison of India's (Sri Lanka's) average applied MFN tariff 7 with its preferential tariffs for Sri Lanka (India) is shown graphically in Figure 2 ( Figure 3 The number of Sri Lanka's export items to India increased from 505 in 1996 to 1,062 in 2006 items on 6 digits of HS classification. There is a visible shift in Sri Lanka's exports from agricultural products 8 to manufacturing goods 9 . The major products and stitched in country C and the shirts are packed for retail in country D before being exported to country E. Article VII together with Annex C of the India Sri Lanka FTA specify the rules of origin for the preferential treatment of goods by partner countries. Rules of origin criteria are crucial to ensure that preferential tariffs are not used to route the non-FTA country products to the Free Trade Area. 7 The MFN principle is a principle of non-discrimination; it is a legal obligation under Article I of GATT to accord equal treatment to all other WTO members of a concession (here tariff) given to any trading partner by a member of WTO. 8 The most ambitious study of NAFTA on highly disaggregated (HS 6 digit) is by Romalis (2005) . This study is based on the estimation of effects of FTA on trade volumes and prices. It identifies demand elasticities by developing a difference in differences based method that exploits the variation across commodities and time in the US tariff preference given to goods produced in other NAFTA countries. It also identifies the supply elasticities by using tariffs as instruments for observed quantities. 
Methodology for Analysis of ISLFTA
To find the trade creation or trade diversion effects of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) on rest of the World, we follow a slightly modified methodology adopted by Romalis (2005) 11 . Ideally, we should also estimate the demand and supply elasticities for our key countries, for which we will need item-wise data on domestic production and consumption of goods. But Governments in India or Sri Lanka do not maintain such data on six digit HS, so we are unable to estimate these two parameters for our study.
In order to use the variations in tariff at the product level like Romalis, we use 6 digit of HS 1996 product classification in our analysis. We choose India and Sri Lanka, (the ISLFTA partners --‗country 1') 12 as our key countries. We first choose China as ‗country 2' and 165 countries grouped together as control country c' (Annex II, Table   A ) to estimate the Trade Diversion/Creation due to ISLFTA. The choice of China as ‗country 2' to identify trade diversion is of minor significance to the empirical analysis.
China was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, its detailed trade data has been available electronically. Secondly, China is having significant trade with for both of our key countries. The choice of China is further due to the reason that, it has substantial trade with most of the control countries c' (Annex II Table A) In order to ensure the robustness of our results, in the second part of our analysis, we use 6 other countries as ‗country 2'. We select ‗country 2' based on the principle mentioned above (i.e. when choose ‗country 2' as China 13 .
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy
In this section, we provide a short outline of the model, which rather than being exhaustive, highlights the needed features for the empirical strategy 14 . In this model, the firms are assumed to produce goods under the perfect competition. Trade is assumed to be driven by varieties and the commodities are differentiated by its source of origin.
The FTA causes a shift in sourcing of varieties by consumers by substituting the goods from the source having preferential access to the FTA partners' market.
In The utilities for consumers in country c are as:
The outputs of a country's firms are identical products, but different countries produce different products in the same industry. Qz is defined as under: 13 The control countries, when we choose Indonesia or Malaysia as our ‗country 2' are same as those when ‗country 2' chosen is China (Table A) . This is due to the fact that both Indonesia and Malaysia are among the ten ASEAN countries having preferential trade relations with China. 
whereˆc tz P , the ideal price index for commodity z in country c is defined as:
The transport costs for international trade are assumed to be in the ‗iceberg' form i.e. gz units must be shipped from country c' for 1 unit to arrive in country c. 15 Ad valorem tariffs are taxes that are levied as a fraction of the value of the imported goods (for example, a 15% India's tariff on imported t-shirt).
If we denote country c in equation (4) as ‗country 1' (say both ISLFTA countries together) , the demand function for ‗country 1' for commodity z from country c' (non-ISLFTA country) becomes:
We have a similar log linear CES demand function for ‗country 2' (say China) for commodity z from country c' (non-ISLFTA country):
By combining (6) and (7), we can compare the value of exports of commodity z from country c' (non-ISLFTA, e.g. Annex II Table A countries) to country 1 (ISLFTA region) and to country 2 (China), grossed up for transport costs and tariffs.
This helps us to get rid of ( ( )) On the other hand, it is possible that due to preferential tariffs, a partner country's production might displace the lower cost suppliers from non-ISLFTA country c' in the ISLFTA region (country 1). 
Data, Sources and its Characteristics
We focus our study for the period 1996 to 2006 i.e. 5 years before ISLFTA and 6 years after ISLFTA by using 6 digit HS 1996 classification data. Basically, we use two types of data ---the applied tariff data 18 and trade data. The major source of data for this study is World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database and Global
Trade Atlas (GTA) of Global Trade Information (GTI) Services. WITS provides access to three other important sources of data -TRAINS (by UNCTAD), COMTRADE (by UNSD) and IDB (by WTO) and GTI is one of the leading supplier of international merchandise trade data. As we use highly rich dataset for our regression analysis, for transparency purposes, it would be useful to discuss the challenges we faced and how we tackled them.
Tariff Data:
We prefer to use tariff data form TRAINS, IDB and National Governments in the order of preference 19 .
Tariff data for India-Tariff data for India was collected from three sources ---IDB 18 Actual tariffs or import duties applied by WTO member countries on their imports, as opposed to tariff rates that are bound or committed. 19 There are two reasons for using the data sources in this order of preference. First, we need all tariff data on ad-valorem basis not on specific duty basis. Our key countries have specific duties on some . Using TRAINS under WITS provide an automatic conversion of these specific duties to ad-valorem equivalents using WTO NAMA methodology. Second, in case the national tariffs are recorded on HS 8 digit basis; TRAINS under WITS also averages the tariffs to the corresponding HS 6 digits for all the tariff lines. Our second preference is for the IDB under WITS. It again converts the HS 8 digit tariffs to average tariffs on HS 6 digit level, but the IDB does not provide an automatic conversion of specific duties to the ad-valorem equivalents as provided by TRAINS database. Our last preference is for the Government tariff data, as these are not available electronically and are mostly are on HS 8 digit level. We have to manually calculate the averages for the corresponding HS 6 digit tariff and put the data in electronic form before using for our analysis. 20 HS 1996 classification has 5113 items (or products) on six digit basis. (when we use Indian Government data), we use the ad-valorem equivalents of specific duties from the nearest year 23 , available from TRAINS. Fourth, the missing data on HS lines within a year. These are only a few lines, so we use the applied tariff rate on nearest HS line from the same year to handle this issue. 22 WITS provides four different ways of conversion of specific duties to ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs)-UNCTAD Method 1, Method 2, WTO Agriculture Method and WTO NAMA method. As most of our trade is of non-agricultural goods, we prefer to choose WTO NAMA method. Choosing other methodology may not make any changes in our results and conclusions of the study. 23 Indian Government introduced specific duties, since 2000, on 271 items of Textile and Clothing sector as ‗ x % or Rs y per unit, whichever is higher'. It was observed that all most all the ad-valorem equivalents of the specific components of tariff are higher than the corresponding ad-valorem duties, so effectively the specific duties are the applied rates of import duties. India did not change the specific duty components on these 271 products even though the government lowered the ad-valorem components on these product lines for the period 2000 to 2006. That is why the use of ad-valorem equivalents of specific duties from the nearest year is perfectly justified. 24 Similarly, the tariff data for United States, EU15, Indonesia, Australia, Switzerland and Malaysia is also collected from TRAINS and IDB through WITS. The issues of missing data, concordance of HS classifications and specific duties, wherever required are handled in the same manner as described above in case of India or Sri Lanka‗s tariff data.
Tariff data for Sri Lanka--
Trade Data 27
: To run the regression for equation (9), we need imports by ISLFTA region (‗country 1') form control countries c' on HS 1996 at 6 digit level and imports by China (‗country 2') from control countries c' at the same level of details for the period 1996 to 2006. We get imports data for India and China (country 2) from the COMTRADE for all the years. Similarly, for US, EU 15, Indonesia, Australia, Switzerland and Malaysia as ‗country 2' trade data is easily available from COMTRADE. 26 We observe that for 76 items from HS 1998/92 classification that do not have any concordance with the HS 1996 classification. All these items were used before 1995. So we drop them form our analysis as we are concentrating only on data from 1996 to 2006. 27 Trade data is relatively easily available for all the countries on COMTRADE. It understood that compared to the tariff data, the trade data is unimportant for the purposes of tariff negotiations at WTO. Due to negotiation sensitivities, it is possible that some countries do not want to share full tariff data.
A caveat needs to be mentioned for Sri Lanka's import data. The import data for Sri 
Estimation of Results and Discussion
Finally, we have seven different panels. Each panel is highly balanced with T (11 years)
observations for each of the N individuals (over 5000 products). To estimate the parameters of equation (9), we choose both the Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random
Effects (RE) model 31 . These two models allow for the heterogeneity across panel units and across time. We consider these two alternatives in the Hausman test framework, fitting both models and comparing their common coefficient estimates. As we might 28 The GTA has data for the years starting form 1998. 29 For Annex Table B , C, D and E control countries we use mirror data on imports by Sri Lanka for years 1996, 1997, 2000 and 2006 due to unavailability of Sri Lanka's import data as reporter to COMTRADE. 30 There may be difference of 5% to 6 % between the actual imports recorded by Sri Lanka (data not available) and the mirror data of imports by Sri Lanka from control countries (data available). This difference is due the fact that in COMTRADE, the imports are recorded CIF (Cost insurance and freight) while the exports are recorded FOB (free on board). Finally, since we use the combined imports by India (import data available for the period under study) and Sri Lanka (import data available for 1998 to 2006 and mirror data for 1996 and 1997) from control countries c'. As India is relatively a large trading partner in ISLFTA region, when we merge the two import data to get the combined imports by ISLFTA partners, the difference due to CIF and FOB values for 1996 and 1997 in Sri Lankan data gets further diluted. 31 We do not use pooled OLS method to estimate our model it 
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expect from the different point estimates generated by RE estimator, the Hausman test's null hypothesis---that the RE estimator is consistent --is soundly rejected ( Table 2 ). The individual effects do appear to be correlated with the regressors; hence our results are based on the Fixed Effects Model (FE).
A summary of the results using Fixed Effects model for seven panels are given in Table   1 . Interpretation of these results will essentially provide the evidence, whether ISLFTA have been trade diverting (or trade creating). For interpreting the results, we refer to the log-difference of combined imports of ISLFTA partners and imports of ‗country 2' from the control countries c' , given by equation (9) .
Column 1 of Table 1 gives the estimates of coefficients, when we use China as our ‗country 2'. The results shows that the sum of the coefficients on the preferential tariffs (β1 and β2) is positive, suggesting that ISLFTA may be trade diverting for non-ISLFTA members (control countries c'). It shows that a 1% reduction in ISLFTA preferential tariffs will cause 1.12 % reduction in imports by the ISLFTA countries from control countries c' relative to imports by China from same control countries. All coefficients (Figure 3 ). This along with the fact that India is a major importer of control country c' products, explains the significance of β1 and nonsignificance of β2. The other coefficients i.e. β3, β4 and β5 are of expected (negative) sign and are highly significant. A reduction in MFN tariffs by the ISLFTA countries would increase the exports to this region from the control countries c'. Similarly, if country 2 (China) reduces its MFN tariff, the exports from control countries c' to country 2 will increase.
In the second part of our analysis, we substitute US, EU-15, Indonesia, Australia, Switzerland and Malaysia respectively as ‗country 2' thereby forming six more panels.
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The control countries c' also change to countries listed in Annex II Table B, Table C,   Table A, Table D, Table E and Table A respectively. The results of regression for these panels are reported in column 2 to 7 ( Table 1 ). The sum of coefficients β1 and β2 is negative in all these six cases. For example, in column 2, when we ‗country 2' is US, we have sum of β1 and β2 equals -3.080 . This shows that as per estimates of our model, when the ISLFTA countries reduce preferential tariffs by 1%, this results in an increase of 3% in exports to the ISLFTA partners from Table B control countries c' compared to exports from the same control countries to US. Once again, coefficients β3 and β4 are of expected (negative) sign and highly significant, showing that a 1% reduction in MFN tariffs by the ISLFTA countries would increase the exports from control countries c' to this region by around 4% compared to exports to US from the same countries. β5 in this case is insignificant. All the coefficients in next five panels in Table 1 (except β5 for in case of EU15, Switzerland and Malaysia as ‗country2' and β4 in case of Australia and Switzerland as ‗country 2') are strongly significant and can be interpreted similarly. Overall, we estimate that a 1% reduction in ISLFTA partners' preferential tariffs results in 2.6% to 4.9 % increase in exports from control countries c' to ISLFTA members compared to the exports from countries c' to ‗country 2'.
As most of the coefficients of our model, including the rho and F-test statistics 32 establish the significance of our model; we conclude that our model is able to assess reasonably well the trade effects of ISLFTA.
One issue, which needs explanation is the difference in trade effects in panel 1 (trade diversion) and six other panels (trade creation) of Table 1 On the other hand, when other six countries are substituted as ‗country 2', we have to exclude only 3 to 10% of total imports by ISLFTA region for estimations of equation (9) . Moreover, we find consistent and strongly significant results for our model form column 2 to 7 in Table 1 . We, therefore, tend to give more weightage to the results obtained from panels having US, EU15 , Indonesia , Australia, Switzerland and Malaysia as ‗country 2'. The results show that a 1% reduction in preferential tariffs among ISLFTA partners will increase 2.6% to 4.9% exports from control countries c'
to ISLFTA partners as compared to the exports from control countries c' to ‗country 2' .
Conclusion
We have shown in this study that ISLFTA has a slight trade creation effect on non-ISLFTA countries. The consumers in India and Sri Lanka are able to get some of the products from the most competitive suppliers within the region; with the result they are able to consume more goods with the same income. Apparently, this has a trade creation effect for the non-members. We have also shown that ISLFTA is one of the few SouthSouth Agreements, which are working effectively. The success of ISLFTA has proved that if the concerns of smaller economy are taken into account with more favorable treatment, then the size differential in the economies of the FTA partners do not matter.
Immediately, after the Agreement, there has been a jump in the trade flows, which could be attributed to the increased engagement of partner countries on products having preferential access and due to the ‗border effect'. We have not gone into the sector specific analysis in this study which could be an interesting area for further research on ISLFTA. Table A  Table B  Table C  Table A  Table D  Table E  Table A Number iii) The dependent variable (lm) is regressed on tariffs on 6 digit products of HS 1996 classification applied by (a) India on Sri Lankan imports-preferential tariffs, (b) Sri Lanka on Indian imports-preferential tariffs, (c) India on imports from control countries-MFN tariffs, (d) Sri Lanka on imports from control countries-MFN tariffs, (e) the ‗country 2' on imports form control countries-MFN tariffs. iv) We use simple average of applied ad valorem tariffs for all products at 6 digit level. For the products with specific duties, we calculate the ad-valorem equivalents form WITS by using methodology adopted in NAMA negotiations at WTO. v) The Import of products is measured on a CIF basis, the units used are $'000 per year. The number of observations with different ‗country 2' varies due the change in products imported by these countries from the control countries. In addition, the difference also arises because; we have dropped the observations with extremely high tariffs (more than 65%). 32 xi) R 2 (within) is reported in the fourth last row. Stata command xtreg, fe obtains its estimates by performing OLS on transformed model, so the R 2 reported do not have all the properties of the OLS R 2 . xi) rho values estimate that 67 % to 81% of variation in log-difference between combined imports of ISLFTA partners and imports of ‗country 2' from the control countries c' (i.e. dependent variable ,lm) is due to the product specific differences u i (i.e. D z ) . xii) F (n-1, N-n-k) : F test provides a test of the null hypothesis H o that all u i =0 . In other words, we wish to test whether the individual specific heterogeneity of u i is necessary i.e. are there distinguishable intercept terms across units? A rejection of this H o indicates that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. xiii) F (k, N-n-k): F statistics to test the null Ho that the coefficients on the regressors (dependent variables) are jointly zero i.e. whether our model is overall significant. A rejection of Ho implies that our model is overall significant. The F-statistic in all the cases shows high significance level for our model as a tool to explain the trade effects of the FTA. As we might expect from the different point estimate generated by the RE estimator, the Hausman test's null hypothesis --that the RE estimator is consistent --is soundly rejected. The product-level individual effects do appear to be correlated with the regressors.
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